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INTRODUCTION 
Increasingly in psychology there is a perception of a 
need to explain human behavior in terms of agency (Bandura, 
1989; Harre, 1984; Howard, 1986; Manicus & Secord, 1983; 
Rychlak, 1988, 1991; Williams, 1992). Human agency refers to 
the hypothesized capacity of persons to actively contribute to 
their behavior above and beyond the influence of biological 
and sociocultural stimulations. That is, an agent may behave 
in consonance with, in addition to, in contradiction of, or 
without regard for such influences (Rychlak, 1988). American 
psychology's traditionally reductionistic image of the person, 
by contrast, attempts to account for the behavior of human 
beings entirely in terms of its biological and/ or 
sociocultural antecedents. Such a view, inherited largely 
from the Baconian science fear of anthropomorphizing the 
physical world, restricts the causal base of explanations in 
psychology and "mechanicomorphizes" (Allport, 1940) the human 
being. Many researchers no longer believe that this non-
agential image of the person can accommodate psychology's 
empirical findings or theoretical growth. 
Each researcher committed to agential explanations of 
human behavior has struggled with the problem of the empirical 
demonstration of agency. Among solutions offered to this 
problem, Logical Learning Theory (LLT; Rychlak, 1988) seeks to 
2 
delineate the specific properties of human learning and 
cognition which may support a view of persons as agents. The 
LLT line of reasoning suggests that for human beings to be 
agents, the very process of human cognition must be telic or 
agential. Hence, the theoretical claim for human agency is 
empirically defensible to the extent that the pro forma 
psychological equipment of human beings, in a Kantian sense, 
can be shown to support a capacity for intentionality. A 
predicational process of cognition, in which meaning is 
extended logically from wider to narrower patterns of meaning, 
can supply one aspect of an empirically testable explanatory 
base for human agency. However, a mediational process of 
cognition, in which meaning is constituted mechanistically 
from external inputs, is implicit in the assumptions of 
traditional, mainstream theories of learning and cognition. 
These theories thereby reject the possibility of agency 
without ever putting the possibility to test. 
The present thesis seeks evidence for human agency by 
confronting the assumptions of mediational theorizing with 
those of predicational theorizing in a verbal learning task. 
That is, the present studies test the predictions of theories 
of cognition that rely on linear, efficient-cause associations 
against the predictions of LLT, a predicational theory of 
cognition that emphasizes patterned, formal-cause meanings. 
Participants are asked to learn words under one of two 
experimenter-given predications (categories). They are then 
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cued to recall the words with their predication in either the 
subject or the predicate position of the cue sentence. 
Logical Learning Theory predicts that cueing with the 
predication in the predicate position of the sentence should 
facilitate recall. Mainstream cognitive theories predict that 
cueing with the predication in the subject position of the 
sentence should facilitate recall. Findings in accord with 
the predictions of LLT would support a predicational view of 
cognition and an agential view of the person; whereas findings 
in accord with the predictions of mainstream cognitive 
theories would support a mediational view of cognition and a 
mechanistic view of the person. These two types of theories 
and their contrasting empirical predictions will be elaborated 
in the review of literature below. 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Theoretical Factors 
Predicational vs. Mediational Theorizing 
Historically, explanations of human 
psychology moved from earlier behavioristic 
learning in 
or stimulus-
response theorizing to the current emphasis on cognitive or 
information processing theorizing (Knapp, 1986). Cognitive 
theories are widely viewed as vast improvements over the 
restrictive, anti-mentalist position of behaviorism (Anderson 
& Bower, 1973; Knapp, 1986). Whereas stimulus-response 
psychology regarded (indeed, felt it was only appropriate to 
regard) the organism "between" the stimulus and the response 
as an unknowable "black box," cognitive psychology seeks to 
place the internal workings of this black box on center stage. 
This shift in theorizing, which occurred in the late 1950s and 
1960s, opened the door to explanations focussed on mental 
organization that were not acceptable in the intellectual 
climate of academic psychology thirty or so years ago. In 
this sense, the "cognitive revolution" has freed psychology 
from the limiting hegemony of behaviorism. 
But this case can be (and, I believe, has been) 
overstated. As Weizenbaum (1976), a respected critic of 
computer models of human reasoning, states, 
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The only difference between Skinner's position and that 
of the theory under discussion (Newell and Simon's (1972) 
information processing theory] -- and this difference is 
important from one point of view but totally irrelevant 
from another -- is that Skinner refuses to look inside 
the black box that is the person, whereas the theory sees 
the inside as a computer. (p. 175, emphasis added) 
Not only Newell and Simon's theory, but cognitive psychology 
in general, has made the computer the dominant metaphor for 
the human mind (Knapp, 1986). Weizenbaum makes the point that 
neither the conception of the person as a black box nor the 
conception of the person as a computer allows the person to 
be, in Skinner's (1974) polemic, "an initiating, creative 
agent" (p. 189) . This lack of human agency is precisely the 
deficiency in modern cognitive theories as well as behaviorism 
that Logical Learning Theory (Rychlak, 1988, in press) seeks 
to address. Despite the changes in theories of learning 
introduced by cognitive psychology, the person as modeled 
after the computer is no more an agent (see Introduction), and 
perhaps is less one, than the person modeled after the rat. 
To clarify why this is so, it is helpful to consider 
LLT's distinction between "predicational" and "mediational" 
theorizing. Predication, by definition, involves the act of 
affirming, denying, or qualifying broader patterns of meaning 
in relation to narrower or targeted patterns of meaning (Bugaj 
& Rychlak, 1989) . Predication is a logical process of meaning 
extension, always proceeding from the wider context of 
meaning, or predication, to the narrower context of meaning, 
or target. For example, if we say, "Sushi is Japanese," we 
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are targeting one concept (sushi) by subsuming or predicating 
it with another concept (Japanese) that acts as a broader 
context of meaning. This simple logical relationship is 
illustrated by Euler circles in Figure 1. The larger, 
subsuming circle represents the concept "Japanese," and the 
smaller, subsumed circle represents the concept "sushi." The 
figure shows that we are framing the meaning of the target 
concept "sushi" by extending the meaning of the predicating 
concept "Japanese" to it. Of course, many other predications 
of "sushi" are possible. For example, we might say, "Sushi is 
eaten," in this case predicating our target concept "sushi" 
with the broader concept "eaten." Other types of 
relationships between predicates and targets are also 
possible. The denial in the meaning of "A tamale is not 
Japanese" is represented in Figure 1 by the smaller circle 
"tamale" lying outside the broader circle "Japanese." And the 
qualification in the meaning of "Some automobiles are 
Japanese" is represented by the smaller circle "automobile" 
partially overlapping the broader circle "Japanese." Among 
this infinity of possible predicational contents, as well as 
the ever-present possibility of denying or qualifying whatever 
we may affirm, it is up to the person to frame his or her 
personal meanings, and to take a position with respect to 
those meanings. For this reason, we must take an 
"introspective" or first-person perspective in explaining 





Figure 1. Euler circles showing predication of sushi as 
Japanese (affirmation), automobile as sometimes Japanese 
(qualification), and tamale as not Japanese (denial). 
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Hence, predication signifies a logical and creative 
process, a process that relies intrinsically on pattern and 
intention. It is a concept that draws on the meanings of 
formal and final causation rather than material and efficient 
causation (Rychlak, 1988). However, it is typically 
overlooked in psychology's efforts to "account for" behavior 
via cause-effect sequences, that the cause of an event may in 
fact be interpreted according to any of these several 
meanings. Material causation explains events in terms of 
underlying substance; formal causation explains events in 
terms of patterned organization; and final causation explains 
events in terms of ends or intentions (Rychlak, 1991). Only 
efficient causation, which explains events in terms of a force 
or impetus pushing them along, is carried in the meaning of 
"cause-effect." An antecedent impels a consequent along the 
arrow of time, in the machine-like or mechanistic process that 
characterizes explanations relying on efficient causation 
(Rychlak, 1991; Slife, 1981). And this particular brand of 
causation forms the basis for mediational rather than 
predicational theories. 
Mediation, by definition, involves extrinsic factors in 
its process: something that is taken in or that is inputted, 
which was not initially a part of the mediational process, 
comes indirectly to direct that process (Bugaj & Rychlak, 
1989). In other words, learning is passive and accretional, 
built up from past inputs. The mediational process only 
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conveys meanings; it does not create them. For example, after 
separately taking in the words "sushi" and "Japanese" and 
perhaps connecting words such as "is, " the mediational process 
can combine these distinct units into the sentence, "Sushi is 
Japanese." This process might be diagrammed in the 
associative network (Wyer, 1989) fashion of Figure 2. The 
nodes "sushi" and "Japanese" are discrete units, which were 
input and then connected to form a mental representation of 
Japanese as an attribute of sushi. (The node "eaten" is shown 
as another associated attribute of sushi.) A mediational 
process underlies all of psychology's mainstream theories of 
learning, whether behaviorist or cognitive, which rely 
ultimately on the connection or association of concepts via 
principles such as frequency and contiguity (see Anderson & 
Bower, 1973, for a sympathetic treatment of associationistic 
models that arrives at a similar conclusion). Such theories 
depend on antecedent events external to the person to explain 
human learning, and therefore support some form of efficient 
cause environmental determinism rather than formal-final cause 
human agency. It should be noted that we take an 
"extraspective" or third-person perspective in explaining 
cognition as a mediational process (Rychlak, in press); that 
is, we view cognition as a process that can be understood 
entirely from the external point of view of an observer of the 
process. 




Figure 2. Associative network representation of concept 
node "sushi" with Japanese and eaten as attributes. 
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(Rychlak, 1988, 1991), and in agreement with Weizenbaum's 
(1976) statement above, that despite changes introduced in 
theories of learning by the cognitive revolution, current 
cognitive approaches are still mediational and cannot support 
human agency. The problem with this situation is not that 
theorists are not free to specify the learning process as 
mediational and human beings as mechanistic, if this is the 
point of view they wish to support. Instead, the problem is 
that the language of cognitive psychology currently offers no 
non-mediational alternative, and traps all psychologists 
working within it into explaining human learning as a 
mediational process, whether they wish to or not. This 
happens because, while the nature of mental contents are 
debated by the various cognitive theories, the nature of the 
learning process itself is simply not questioned. Process is 
equated with computer-like information processing (Knapp, 
1986) . Logical Learning Theory offers a predicational 
alternative to this view, and uniquely, a cognitive basis for 
the assertion of human agency. 
I will now review the more widely cited cognitive 
theories bearing on learning and recall, including 
organizational factors in memory (Bower, 1970), levels of 
processing {Craik & Lockhart, 1972), encoding specificity 
{Tulving & Thomson, 1973), spreading activation theory 
(Anderson, 1985; Anderson & Bower, 1973; Bower, 1981), and 
associative network theories (Hastie & Carlston, 1980; Srull, 
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Lichtenstein, & Rothbart, 1985; Wyer, 1989; Wyer, Bodenhausen, 
& Srull, 1984), in order to clarify with greater specificity 
why these theories are mediational, and to lay the groundwork 
for extrapolating their predictions under the conditions of my 
study's design. 
overview of Mediational Theorizing in Cognitive Psychology 
Organizational factors in memory. Bower's {1970) paper 
on organizational factors in memory represents an early 
attempt to reinterpret learning experiments in a more 
cognitive or mentalistic fashion. He reviews a range of 
experimental examples demonstrating the importance of 
organizational strategies for memory. These organizational 
principles have become well known in cognitive psychology. 
For example, Bower {1970) demonstrates that in paired 
associates learning, cued recall improves if subjects can 
discern or invent a rule that generates the correct "response" 
for the "stimulus" word or item. Serial recall (the recall of 
the items of a list in correct sequence) is aided when 
subjects group the items into chunks or "perceptual units." 
Free recall improves when subjects develop "better integrated 
chunks" (p. 34, emphasis added) or subjective groupings of the 
i terns. In all learning contexts, ambiguous words appear to be 
understood according to the mental set of the subject. 
These assertions certainly receive no argument from the 
predicational theorist! In fact, from a Logical Learning 
Theory point of view, they read like a catalog of examples of 
13 
the predicational process. Formal cause, the principle most 
fundamental to predication, is inherent in the very idea of 
organization, and is articulated in the ideas of rule 
following (Rychlak, 1992), grouping, integration, and mental 
set (Rychlak, 1988). Moreover, Bower's (1970) analysis 
specifically refutes some of the mediational principles of 
earlier S-R theorizing. He points out that mere repetition of 
the same serial list does not improve recall if subjects do 
not learn the list in the same chunks each time. Similarly, 
longer exposure to words in a free recall context does not 
improve recall if subjects must change the groupings of the 
words they are learning. As Bower (1970) states, "The results 
support the view that increasing stability of subjective 
groups is normally a concomitant of, perhaps even a cause of, 
increasing free recall with practice trials" (p. 35, emphasis 
added) . In such statements, it would seem that Bower is 
giving the formal cause priority over the efficient cause 
expressed in S-R principles of association. Bower (1970) even 
emphasizes that mental relations deal with "meanings ... not 
words" (p. 37), suggesting to the predicational theorist the 
priority of final cause and intention over associated inputs. 
However, Bower's (1970) own favored explanations of the 
mental phenomena he outlines so well remain couched in the 
extraspective computer lingo of information processing 
theories. He posits a "central processor" that directs 
searches of "hierarchical list structures" in memory 
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retrieval. The lack of agency or personal directedness of 
this processor, as well as the absence of an introspective 
perspective, is underscored by Bower's need to place the word 
know in quotes, in his remark that "the central processor 
'knows' what subset of features of the stimulus word to 
examine" (p. 43). Furthermore, Bower (1970) retains the 
mediational S-R concept of "associations" (pp. 26, 33) or 
"links" (p. 43) as the pathways that connect our discrete 
mental contents together. In this (very common) mixed 
metaphor of computer structure and S-R associationism, 
organization benefits the subject by giving the central 
processor a retrieval plan, and also by "strengthening" the 
associations between the i terns that are to be remembered. 
This contrasts with a predicational explanation, in which 
memory benefits from organization because cognition is 
inherently organizational and meaning-giving. We see that for 
Bower (1970), the formal and final causes do not rest as 
explanations themselves, but must be subsumed by the efficient 
cause. Ultimately, his is a mediational model, in which 
mental organization is built up from associated inputs, and 
not a predicational model, in which organization is implicit 
in the act of predicating one concept of another. 
Encoding specificity. Tulving's principle of encoding 
specificity represents a significant contribution in the 
history of cognitive psychology that continues to enjoy 
popularity (see Anderson, 1985; Eysenck & Keane, 1990). 
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Tulving and Thomson (1973) introduced the principle of 
encoding specificity to explain why in some circumstances, 
contrary to the predictions of other cognitive theories, 
subjects failed to recognize words that they were able to 
recall. Cognitive theories such as the generation-recognition 
model (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) posit recall as a two-step 
sequence in which the person first generates the target item 
and then recognizes it. Therefore, the probability of 
successful recall of an item cannot exceed the probability of 
successful recognition of it. Tulving and Thomson's (1973) 
own experiments demonstrate conditions under which this model 
fails. Specifically, when subjects are able to generate 
target words that appear on lists they have previously 
learned, but do not view the words in the context of the cues 
learned with those target words, they frequently fail to 
recognize the target words. However, subjects are able to 
recall many of the target words if they are presented with the 
original cues. Tulving and Thomson (1973) offer the principle 
of "encoding specificity" as explanation: 
All these data suggest that the effectiveness of a 
particular cue depends on how the to-be-retrieved item 
was encoded at input. The recognition failure of 
recallable words represents an extreme case of the 
general principle that encoding determines the trace, and 
the trace determines the effectiveness of retrieval cues. 
(p. 370) 
Tulving and Thomson (1973) conclude that each memory episode 
is stored with contextual information specific to its 
occurrence, and that only cues from this encoding context will 
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facilitate retrieval of the memory. It seems hardly necessary 
to belabor the point that Tulving and Thomson (1973) employ an 
extraspective computer-based model in their explanation. 
Again, LLT embraces the implications of these 
experimental demonstrations, while offering an alternative 
explanation from the perspective of a non-mediational theory. 
Recall the discussion of the process of predication. In this 
process, the meaning of a target item always depends upon the 
broader context of meaning -- the predication -- that is 
extended to it. Essentially, "predication" and "context" are 
equivalent terms in LLT (Rychlak, 1988). Memory for an event 
is achieved by the re-predication of the same meaningful 
relations among items (Rychlak, in press). The introspective 
LLT line of reasoning suggests that, in learning lists of 
target words and cues as in the Tulving and Thomson (1973) 
studies, subjects attempt to predicate the target words with 
the cue words . For example, the subject learning the cue-
target pair "glue-chair" may say to herself, "It is possible 
to put a chair together with glue." It is not at all 
surprising to the Logical Learning theorist that the subject's 
memory is better facilitated by the establishment of her 
initial predicating context, that is, by the presentation of 
the list cues, than by other "associates" to the target words, 
including even the target word by itself. Without the initial 
predication, the meaningful relationship is not drawn, and the 
subject does not remember. 
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Moreover, LLT is able to explain easily the "asymmetry of 
associations between list cues and target items" (Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973, p. 368). That is, it is easier to remember a 
target item in the context of its initial predication (the 
list cue) than it is to remember the list cue in the context 
of the target item. This is almost self-evident from the 
nature of the predicational process, which, unlike 
associationistic processes, is inherently directional, 
proceeding from wider to narrower contexts of meaning (in this 
case, from the list cue to the target item). Once again LLT 
gains its particular explanatory power from its recognition of 
the formal cause. 
Levels of processing. Craik' s levels of processing 
framework represents another historically significant 
contribution to cognitive psychology that continues to enjoy 
popularity (see Anderson, 1985; Eysenck & Keane, 1990). In 
their 1972 article, Craik and Lockhart express dissatisfaction 
with the "box approach" to memory that is fundamental to the 
"computer analogy on which information flow models are based" 
(p. 673). They suggest that experimentally demonstrated 
distinctions between short term and long term memory might be 
viewed not as evidence for the existence of multiple memory 
stores, but instead as evidence for the impact of processing 
limitations on encoding operations. According to craik and 
Lockhart (1972), if a person is able to process a perceived 
item at a "deeper level" during encoding, retention will 
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automatically be improved. They state that "at deeper levels 
the subject can make more use of learned cognitive structures 
so that the item will become more complex and semantic" (Craik 
& Lockhart, 1972, p. 679). Deeper levels of processing, then, 
signify increased elaboration according to previously learned 
material {Craik & Lockhart, 1972). This principle is widely 
used to explain the better retention subjects demonstrate in 
incidental memory tasks of words that they treat semantically 
(according to their meaning) rather than structurally 
(according to their spelling or appearance). Presumably, 
words treated semantically are processed more deeply. 
As with Bower {1970), we find these theorists criticizing 
other mediational theories for specifically mediational 
aspects of that theorizing -- but then offering alternative 
constructs that are themselves mediational. For example, 
Craik and Lockhart (1972) emphasize that increased processing 
time will not benefit memory unless deeper processing occurs 
during that time. Such statements reflect an ambiguity, 
perhaps even a circularity, in the meaning of "deeper." In 
the absence of the formal-final cause ideas of meaning and 
meaningfulness (Rychlak, 1988), it is difficult to explain why 
some sorts of processing, such as "semantic" processing, are 
deeper than others, such as "structural" processing. At best, 
we are left with an extraspective counting of linkages among 
mental contents to explain depth of processing ( craik & 
Lockhart, 1972). In LLT, of course, meaning-extension stands 
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as a central principle in its own right (Rychlak, 1988). A 
subject extends meaning to, or predicates, the i terns we 
experimenters have him learn, and these predications vary in 
meaningfulness to him. The subject will remember items he has 
predicated more meaningfully because those predications 
introspectively play a more central organizational role 
(formal cause) in his cognition. Most people find predicating 
a word according to a semantic category to be more meaningful 
to them than predicating the word according to its structural 
features. In the LLT explanation of the depth of processing 
phenomenon, then, the mediational concept of depth is replaced 
by the predicational concept of meaningfulness. 
Spreading activation theory. The next two theories to be 
discussed, Anderson's (1990; Anderson & Bower, 1973) spreading 
activation theory and Wyer and Srull's (Srull et al., 1985; 
Wyer, 1989) associative network theory, are variants of the 
currently dominant network model of memory (Eysenck & Keane, 
1990). Generally speaking, network theories conceptualize 
memory extraspecti vely as a set of concept nodes that are 
arranged via associations into a hierarchical organization. 
They retain the mechanistic underpinnings of British 
Empiricism and American Behaviorism, as they reduce mental 
organization to associations that are built up between 
elements through frequency and contiguity (Anderson & Bower, 
1973). According to proponents Anderson and Bower (1973), 
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even in these cognitive theories, associations are still the 
"glue" that connects mental items together (p 31). 
Spreading activation theory's leading proponent has been 
the well-known cognitive psychologist John R. Anderson. 
Anderson's (1990) famous ACT* system is an artificial 
intelligence model of human problem solving, which includes a 
semantic network of "declarative" knowledge and a production 
system of "procedural" knowledge. In essence, the former 
encompasses the body of "facts" that one knows in a given 
domain, and the latter encompasses the skills or procedures 
one has learned to employ in that domain. Knowledge 
structures of either kind function only when they are 
activated above a threshold. The level of activation of a 
knowledge structure is a function of the strength of pathways 
or associations to that structure, and the number of competing 
pathways that cause interference with the activation of that 
structure (Anderson, 1985) . In other words, the model assumes 
that knowledge is stored in the brain in a form that the 
electro-chemical activity of the brain activates in some way 
to (efficiently) cause memory and behavior. In his 
undergraduate textbook, Anderson {1985) goes so far as to cast 
nearly his entire discussion of the basic concepts and 
principles of memory in terms of spreading activation theory 
(see his chapter 6). For Anderson, remembering is activation. 
Anderson's colleague Bower, whose early paper on organization 
I reviewed above (Bower, 1970), himself interprets the 
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phenomenon of mood-state-dependent memory in terms of a 
spreading activation model in which emotions are nodes in the 
semantic network (Bower, 1981). He states, 
When activated above a threshold, the emotion unit 
transmits excitation to those nodes that produce the 
pattern of autonomic arousal and expressive behavior 
commonly assigned to that emotion .... Activation of an 
emotion node also spreads activation throughout the 
memory structures to which it is connected, creating 
subthreshold excitation at those event nodes. (p. 135) 
Whereas LLT interprets state-dependent memory facilitation in 
terms of the formal cause re-establishment of the person's 
original predicational context (Rychlak, in press), Bower 
(1979) interprets it according to a material-efficient cause 
neuronal activity that excites memories that are linked to an 
emotion node. 
More recently, Anderson (1990) has questioned the 
necessity of tying a theory of cognition to pseudo-
physiological constructs like activation. He reflects that 
his previous concern has been to create a cognitive model that 
is "neurally plausible" (p. 2), but that what happens at the 
"level" of neuron functioning is in fact conceptually 
independent of what happens in the logic of cognition 
(Anderson, 1990). Rychlak (in press), the author of LLT, has 
taken this type of idea even farther in his discussion of the 
different grounds of explanation. Explanations grounded in 
the Bios, the domain of the life sciences, most usually employ 
an extraspective account of events in terms of material and 
efficient causation. By contrast, explanations grounded in 
22 
the Logos, the domain of human reasoning and cognition, 
ideally employ an introspective account of events that may 
include formal and final causation. The Logos is not beholden 
to the Bios to support its explanations, any more than the 
Bios is beholden to the Logos. Therefore these grounds are 
not conceived in terms of rank-ordered 11 levels 11 of 
explanation, but rather as separate and independent, yet 
internally consistent, frames of reference, which the theorist 
may draw upon according to his or her explanatory goals and 
predilections. An LLT perspective would find spreading 
activation theory not only mediational, but also misleading in 
its insistence that cognitive theories (Logos) must explain 
cognition in terms of brain activity (Bios). 
Associative network theory. Associative network theory 
has been elaborated predominately by those researchers 
studying person memory (e.g., see Hastie, Ostrom, Ebbesen, 
Wyer, Hamilton, & Carlston, 1980). Although the present 
studies do not employ specifically a person memory task, 
associative network theory will be reviewed because its 
principles are representative of some of the most current 
thinking in cognitive psychology. 
According to associative network theory, information 
about a person is represented hierarchically as nodes in a 
propositional network, with the person as the highest-level 
node, trait or category information as the next-highest-level 
nodes, and specific behavior episodes as the lowest-level 
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nodes (Wyer, 1989). Associative links, which are formed by 
the contiguous apprehension of behavioral episodes (Hastie & 
Carlston, 1980), or by thinking about behavioral episodes in 
relation to the person's traits and to each other (Wyer et 
al. , 1984) , connect these nodes to each other and to the 
"higher-order" person node ( Srull et al., 1985) . Memory 
retrieval is accomplished via a search that begins at the 
person node and follows associative paths to activate lower-
level trait and then behavior nodes (Srull et al., 1985; Wyer, 
1989) . The likelihood of retrieval of behavioral or trait 
target information increases with stronger associations of 
that target node to more abstract nodes, and with a greater 
number of same-level nodes directly associated to the target 
node (Wyer et al., 1984). 
Of all of the cognitive theories reviewed above, it is 
perhaps easiest to see the mediational assumptions in this 
theory. The processes of encoding and retrieval are again 
described from an extraspective perspective, as easily 
descriptive of the computer as the human being. Further, 
these processes are conceived of as efficiently caused, with 
the characteristics of the input (its abstractness, relevance 
and congruity with previous input) determining its place in 
the nodal hierarchy and the number and strength of 
associations to it (Wyer, 1989). Moreover, level of 
abstractness is fixed in the network and confounded with the 
particular meaning of the item (person, trait or behavior); 
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whereas in a predicational model, any concept can be 
predicated of another to give a different meaning to it. For 
example, we can say, "A man is a tree," predicating "man" with 
the concept "tree, " which might suggest to us such meanings as 
that a man is always growing and developing, or that a man 
goes through seasons in his life. But we can as easily 
reverse the predication, saying "A tree is a man," which might 
suggest to us such meanings as that a tree is also alive, or 
that a tree is an individual among other trees (Rychlak, in 
press). Predication is an active and continuous process of 
meaning creation, not a passive evoking of past inputs. 
Logical Learning Theory: A Predicational Alternative 
It is my hope that the above discussion of major 
cognitive theories in contrast to LLT will facilitate better 
understanding of the distinction between mediational and 
predicational models of memory and cognition. The continued 
high visibility of mediational theories such as associative 
network theory suggests that a substantial contingent of 
cognitive psychologists still find the traditional information 
processing metaphor a promising model for human cognition. 
Some have made this choice from a knowledgeable position of 
the history and implications of their stance. Others, 
perhaps, have simply never known of a serious "scientific" 
alternative, or have not followed the implications of this 
line of thinking for concepts they might pref er to endorse 
such as human agency. Logical Learning Theory offers an 
25 
alternative, predicational view of human reasoning that is at 
once methodologically rigorous and theoretically supportive of 
human creativity, freedom, and responsibility. It builds on 
a modern philosophy of science that acknowledges the 
centrality of meaning to human affairs, the multiple meanings 
of causality, and the necessity of an introspective and 
reflexive theory of human psychology (Howard, 1986; Manicus & 
Secord, 1983; Polanyi, 1962; Rychlak, 1988, 1991, in press; 
Slife, 1981; Williams, 1992). I will now turn to a review of 
the empirical successes of LLT research and the development of 
the present studies. 
Empirical Factors 
Research on Logical Learning Theory 
Research on affective assessment. Early research on LLT 
(1963-1983) centered around the construct of affective 
assessment (Rychlak, 1988, 1992). Affective assessment is 
defined as the innate capacity that people have to render 
oppositional judgments of their circumstances, in the sense of 
good-bad, like-dislike, or prefer-disprefer (Rychlak, 1992). 
Affective assessment is understood in LLT as a sort of 
transcendental predication, a meaning which people extend from 
birth into all of their ongoing experience. Rychlak and his 
colleagues have conducted extensive experimentation 
demonstrating the independence of affective assessment from 
various mediational concepts based on frequency or contiguity, 
which they group together under the term "association value" 
(Rychlak, 1988, 1992) . 
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For example, even when measures of 
association value are held constant, a "liked over disliked" 
facility in learning both words and eve trigrams is still 
demonstrated (Rychlak, 1990). In studies using a range of 
levels of association value for eve trigrams, level of 
affective assessment has been shown to be statistically 
independent of level of association value; and measures of 
affective assessment load on different factors from measures 
of association value in factor analyses (Rychlak, 1988). 
Moreover, studies of learning style have demonstrated that 
subjects (such as psychiatric patients) who predicate the 
learning task, themselves, or their life circumstances 
negatively rather than positively show diminished or even 
reversed "liked over disliked" learning rates, in effect 
extending the meaning of their general negativism into the 
specific tasks with which they are faced (Rychlak, 1990) . 
Al together, evidence has supported the LLT assertion that 
affective assessment stands as a sort of formal-cause Kantian 
category in its own right, a meaning that people employ as a 
fundamental means of organizing their learning. 
In the course of LLT's development, affective assessment 
came to be understood as a key example of the more general 
cognitive principles of oppositionality and predication. 
Oppositionality is seen in the bipolar nature of the "liked 
vs. disliked" distinction. More generally, oppositionality 
signifies a bipolar relation between meanings in which one 
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pole delimits and hence enters into the definition of the 
other pole, and vice versa (Rychlak, 1990, in press). 
Predication (discussed in detail above) is seen in the 
extension of the meaning of affective assessment into ongoing 
experience -- essentially, the predication of that experience 
as "something liked" or "something disliked." Taken together, 
oppositionality and predication -- the ability to see multiple 
possibilities and to structure personal meanings -- form the 
basis of LLT' s claim for human agency (Rychlak, in press). As 
the present studies investigate aspects of predication but not 
oppositionality, relevant LLT research on predication will be 
reviewed. (Please note that the term participant will be used 
in place of the term experimental subject in discussing the 
studies dealing with predication, including the present 
studies, in order to distinguish references to these persons 
from references to the grammatical subject of a sentence.) 
Research on predication. In two studies investigating 
the roles of both predication and oppositionality in learning, 
Rychlak and his colleagues examined the importance of the 
learner's establishment of specific meaningful relationships 
between learned items (formal cause), in contrast to the 
mediational view in which learned i terns hook up, or are 
associated, in an undifferentiated and automatic way 
(efficient cause) (Rychlak, Williams, & Bugaj, 1986). Using 
eve trigrams, these investigators created instances of four 
different ways of relating or predicating items: unqualified 
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affirmation (e.g. , "HIB is always VIC") , qualified affirmation 
(e.g., "HIB is sometimes YAT"), negative affirmation (e.g., 
"HIB is never QIN"), and oppositional affirmation (e.g., "HIB 
is opposite JOQ"). This is essentially a paired-associates 
design, once common in verbal learning research, in which in 
this case the left-hand term is held constant with four 
different right-hand items relating to it. Participants were 
presented with the left-hand item and its four predications, 
and asked to recall the appropriate right-hand items. Because 
the right-hand items are in the predicate position of English 
syntax, LLT postulates that participants will consider them 
the broader context of meaning, or predication, which target 
the left-hand item in the subject position of the sentence. 
Of course, the point here is that eve trigrams ("nonsense 
syllables") suggest no common meanings in and of themselves. 
Participants in this task must establish meaning solely 
through the (formal cause) syntactical relationships presented 
to them. Indeed, as Rychlak and his colleagues predicted, the 
type of predicating relationship influenced participants' 
ability to correctly recall the predicating trigrams, with 
oppositional relationships serving as the best learning 
heuristic (Rychlak et al., 1986). Hence, all "associations" 
between items are not created equal, but depend on the nature 
of the meaningful relationship -- the predication -- that the 
learner draws between the items. 
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Ulasevich (1991) investigated both affective assessment 
and predication more generally. He constructed a series of 
sentences describing a person, such as "When it comes to 
dancing, John is " The word completing this 
sentence would predicate John in the realm of dancing (or 
whatever realm of behavior is described). For some 
participants, the word completing this particular sentence was 
"graceful," which would be a positive predication, and for 
others it was "clumsy," which would be a negative predication. 
Participants were asked to learn a series of eight such 
statements, four positive and four negative. Following LLT, 
Ulasevich (1991) predicted that because affective assessment 
is such a fundamental predication, used by people to order 
their memories prior even to semantic organization, then 
during learning trials, participants would learn the correct 
affective quality of the word completing the sentence even 
before they had learned the word itself. This prediction was 
confirmed, with participants regularly able to anticipate the 
affective quality of the sentence ending on an earlier 
learning trial than they were able to anticipate the actual 
word. Furthermore, when participants offered an incorrect 
word to complete the sentence, this word was usually 
affectively correct. Apparently participants extended 
affective meanings to the words in order to learn them, 
supporting the LLT contention that predication is basic to the 
process of learning. 
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Finally, Rychlak and his colleagues have conducted a 
series of experiments on predication in which participants are 
cued with either the subject or predicate of a target sentence 
(see Rychlak, in press, chapter 5). For example, in one of 
the most recent of these studies (Rychlak, Stilson, & Rychlak, 
1990), participants received a list of 24 sentences such as "A 
tennis racket can be used as a spaghetti strainer. A rock can 
be used as a paperweight." Participants were asked to recall 
as many of these sentences as possible after one reading. 
They were then cued with a word from the sentence in order to 
help them recall more of the sentences. The cue could be 
either the subject of the sentence ("tennis racket," "rock,") 
or the predicate of the sentence ("spaghetti strainer," 
"paperweight"). Logical Learning Theory predicts that 
predicate cueing should be more facilitative to recall, 
because the predicate, by virtue of its position in the 
formal-cause structure of a sentence (and regardless of its 
content), represents the broader meaning which extends to the 
target meaning in the subject of the sentence. This is 
exactly what has been cross-validated in several studies 
(Rychlak, in press; Rychlak, Stilson, & Rychlak, 1990) . 
The Present Studies 
The present studies include two closely related 
experiments which continue the line of inquiry of LLT research 
on predication, empirically pitting the predictions of LLT 
against those of mediational theorizing. As outlined in the 
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review of research above, LLT argues that syntax reflects our 
semantic (i.e., meaning-making or predicational) process, and 
that predication is represented linguistically in English 
syntax by the predicate of a sentence. That is, the predicate 
of a sentence represents the broader context of meaning that 
subsumes the meaning of the target under consideration, which 
itself is represented by the subject of the sentence. 
{Strictly speaking, the verb plus the object of a sentence is 
referred to as the "complete predicate." The verb gives us 
the relation obtaining between the targeted subject and the 
conceptualizing object. The research on predication by 
Rychlak et al., 1986, described above, demonstrates the 
conceptual importance of the specific relation between subject 
and object as represented by the verb. However, in the 
present studies, the verb "to be" is held constant, and only 
the object of the sentence is varied. Hence, in the context 
of the present studies, the object alone will be referred to 
as the predicate.) 
For example, in the sentence "Sushi is Japanese, " the 
word Japanese predicates the target word sushi. Likewise, in 
the sentence "Sushi is eaten," the word eaten predicates the 
target word sushi. According to LLT, we implicitly understand 
this organization whenever we encounter a sentence. In fact, 
as reviewed above, LLT research has predicted and found that 
cued recall for sentences is facilitated when the cue word is 
the sentence predicate rather than the sentence subject. 
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Essentially, grammatical structure reflects an introspectively 
meaningful cognitive organization. Supplying participants 
with their broader context of meaning (the predicate of the 
sentence) allows them to extend that meaning to the target 
(the subject of the sentence), reestablishing their initial 
predication and recalling the sentence. The reverse of this 
procedure, supplying participants with the subject of the 
sentence so that they must recall the predicate of the 
sentence, works less well because it does not suggest the same 
meaningful organization initially established by the 
participants when they read the sentences. 
In the present studies, I am predicting that cued recall 
will be facilitated when a cue's grammatical predicate (as 
opposed to its grammatical subject) is the same as the 
predication with which a person originally subsumed the target 
word. In this case, we are not dealing with participants who 
are learning a sentence and being cued with a word taken from 
that sentence. Instead, participants are learning an item in 
a general category (i.e. , predicating the item by that 
category), and then being cued for recall of the item with a 
sentence containing both that category and new information. 
To illustrate using the example in the previous paragraph, it 
is expected that the cue "the eaten item that is Japanese" 
will better facilitate recall for the participant who has 
already predicated sushi as Japanese, whereas the cue "the 
Japanese item that is eaten" will better facilitate recall for 
33 
the participant who has already predicated sushi as eaten. 
Notice that both cues contain identical information, that the 
item is eaten and that it is Japanese. Only the grammatical 
position of the information is different. (This feature of 
the design makes the studies different from the encoding 
specificity research paradigm, in which participants are cued 
with either a presented cue or an extralist cue. Here both of 
these types of cues are contained in the cue sentence. The 
"specificity" being tested is for grammatical position, not 
type of cue.) The cue sentence represents an organization of 
meanings by virtue of its grammatical structure, which may or 
may not coincide with the way in which the participant has 
already organized his or her meanings. If it does, then 
recall is facilitated. If it does not, the participant must 
reorganize his or her meanings to successfully recall the 
target item. 
Predicational vs. mediational interpretation of reaction 
time. The present studies differ from past LLT research in 
that reaction time rather than learning trials, sentences 
recalled, etc., is used to operationalize facility of recall. 
This is somewhat of a departure for LLT research. Because LLT 
does not conceptualize cognition in terms of efficient 
causation, reaction time is not used to track stages of 
cognitive processing, as it is in the "chronometric analyses" 
of information processing experiments (Eysenck & Keane, 1990; 
Siegler, 1983). In chronometric analyses, studies are 
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"designed to test the hypothesis that processing proceeds 
through independent (additive) serially executed stages" 
(Siegler, 1983). For these researchers, the alternative to 
independent, additive, serially executed stages is not the 
formal cause predicational process of LLT, but rather the same 
component stages occurring in parallel (Eysenck & Keane, 1990; 
Hastie & Carlston, 1980; Siegler, 1983). Reaction time is 
assumed to track a sequence of extraspecti vely conceived 
"simple basic actions," borrowed from the computer to include 
recoding, storing, copying, moving, erasing, and comparing 
symbols {Simon, 1985, p. 24). From this perspective, the time 
it takes to remember a target item reflects the duration and 
ordering of the stages of cognitive processing. The 
mediational assumption that memory and cognition take place 
through timebound stages, however, is not tested. 
By contrast, cognition viewed as a predicational process 
creates meanings through conceptual relations, in an immediate 
rather than mediate fashion; that is, without regard for the 
passage of time (Rychlak, 1991; Slife, 1981). Logic, pattern, 
and organization inhere in the meaning of formal causation and 
do not depend on the timeline of efficient causation for their 
existence. From such a perspective, the introspectively 
meaningful pattern or organization of cognition is assumed to 
be fundamental. Efficiently caused processing stages are not 
inherent to meaning, which can be understood fully in terms of 
formal-final cause conceptual relations. The efficient cause, 
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however, can act as an instrumentality for the formal and 
final cause (Rychlak, 1988). Efficiently caused events can be 
understood as occurring under the direction of formal-final 
cause organization and intention. From this perspective, the 
time it takes to remember a target item ultimately reflects 
the effortfulness or difficulty one has in extending meaning 
to recreate an introspectively meaningful predication of the 
item. 
Predicational vs. mediational predictions for the present 
studies. The contrast between the predicational and 
mediational interpretations of reaction time enables an 
elegant test to be made of the mediational assumption of 
memory as efficient cause processing. As I discussed above, 
LLT predicts that cued recall will be facilitated when a cue's 
grammatical predicate (as opposed to its grammatical subject) 
is the same as the category with which a person originally 
subsumed the target word. This prediction rests on the 
assumption of a formal cause structure in both language syntax 
and introspective meaning. Moreover, facilitation of memory 
will in this case be measured by shorter response time. The 
exciting thing about this design is that, because of their 
efficient cause interpretations of reaction time and 
cognition, mediational theories would make the opposite 
prediction! That is, they would predict that cued recall will 
be facilitated when a cue's grammatical subject, not its 
grammatical predicate, is the same as the category with which 
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a person originally subsumed the target word. Whereas much of 
my argument for LLT so far has involved merely a novel 
interpretation of known results, the present studies offer a 
clear cut test of competing predictions. 
Why do I contend that mediational theories of cognition 
would make the opposite prediction? Because mediational 
theories rely ultimately on the efficient cause rather than 
the formal cause, they have no reason to assign importance to 
the pattern represented in grammatical position. Associations 
between mental items are essentially indistinguishable; at 
best they are "tagged" according to the relation they signify, 
using another association (Hastie et al., 1980). Organization 
may be built up from associated items like structures erected 
from tinker toys; however, there is no sense of the inherent 
meaningful organization in which a broader context of meaning 
subsumes a narrower, targeted context. When the formal cause 
pattern of grammar is disregarded in favor of the efficient 
cause arrow of time, only an item's sequence in the sentence 
becomes important. What comes first can be processed first, 
and the participant's advantage lies in receiving the category 
she learned earlier (subject position of sentence) rather than 
later (predicate position of sentence) . For example, in 
contrast to LLT, these theories would predict that the cue 
"the eaten item that is Japanese" would lead to faster recall 
for the participant who has categorized sushi as eaten; 
whereas the cue "the Japanese item that is eaten" would lead 
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to faster recall for the participant who has categorized sushi 
as Japanese. Freedman and Loftus (1971), working within a 
spreading activation model, make exactly this prediction for 
exactly the above reasons: the category with which the 
participant subsumes the target will better facilitate recall 
if it is given first, because this allows a head start in the 
"search" process. Their recall process is mediate, with 
recall requiring time for searching, whereas LLT's is 
immediate, with recall occurring as soon as the predicational 
pattern is apprehended. Although Freedman and Loftus' (1971) 
claim was made over twenty years ago, we have not yet seen it 
tested against a predicational claim. The present studies 
will make this test. 
STUDY 1 
Statement of the Problem 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I: It is predicted that participants who 
learn target words under an experimenter-given 
predication will respond faster to cue sentences when 
that predication is in the predicate position of the 
sentence, and respond slower to cue sentences containing 
identical information when that predication is in the 
subject position of the sentence. 
Hypothesis II: It is predicted that participants who 
learn target words under no experimenter-given 
predication will show no overall difference in their 
response times to these two types of cue sentences. 
Rationale 
Hypothesis I follows from the discussion of LLT in the 
review of literature above. Logical Learning Theory suggests 
that grammar reflects the underlying predicational process of 
cognition. Specifically, a predication is represented 
linguistically by the predicate of a sentence, and the target 
of the predication is represented by the subject of a 
sentence. Thus, a cue sentence represents a meaningful 
cognitive organization by virtue of its grammatical structure, 
which may or may not coincide with the way in which the 
participant has already organized his or her meanings (in this 
case, around the experimenter-given predication). 
Participants must reestablish their initial predication in 
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order to recall the sentence. Therefore, recall will be 
facilitated when the cue sentence represents the same 
organization as the participant's introspective organization, 
i.e. , when the predicate of the cue sentence contains the 
participant's initial predication. Otherwise (i.e., when the 
subject of the cue sentence rather than the predicate contains 
the participant's initial predication), the participant must 
reorganize his or her meanings to successfully recall the 
target item. Reaction time will be used to measure ease or 
facilitation of recall, without assuming that an efficient 
cause process is directing cognition. 
Hypothesis II is also implied by the discussion of LLT in 
the review of literature above. Participants who are not 
supplied with an experimenter-given predication must supply an 
organization to their learning of the target words themselves. 
They might spontaneously predicate the words according to the 
experimenter's categories or according to some other 
idiosyncratic categories. For any one participant, recall 
will still be facilitated if his or her initial predication is 
in the predicate position of the cue sentence. However, 
across a group of participants employing a variety of 
different predications, the facilitation of one type of cue 




Participants were 44 undergraduate students ( 16 male, 28 
female) enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Loyola 
University of Chicago. All participants were native English 
speakers. Participation in the experiment partially fulfilled 
a course requirement. 
Independent Variables 
Learning task condition. There were two experimental 
learning task conditions, designated the Action and Ethnic 
conditions, as well as a Control condition. Table 1 shows the 
target words that were learned, arrayed according to both 
"action" and "ethnic" predications or categories. The 
"action" predication signified the action or use of a target 
word (i.e., ridden, worn, eaten), and the "ethnic" predication 
signified the national or ethnic association of a target word 
(i.e., Mexican, Japanese, (American] Indian) . Participants in 
all conditions learned this same set of nine target words. 
However, participants in the Action and Ethnic conditions 
learned these words under the "action" and "ethnic" 
predications or groupings shown in Table 1, respectively, and 
participants in the Control condition learned these words with 
no predication or grouping suggested by the experimenter. 
Specifically, participants in the Action and Ethnic conditions 
viewed each predication or grouping following by its three 
target words on index cards. Participants in the Control 
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condition viewed only the nine target words on index cards. 
Moreover, as also shown in Table 1, the frequency of the 
target words in the English language, according to the Kucera 
and Francis (1967) list, was held constant to control for any 
effects of differential familiarity with the target words. 
ACTION 
TABLE 1 
TARGET WORDS ARRAYED ACCORDING TO 
BOTH ACTION AND ETHNIC PREDICATIONS 
ETHNIC PREDICATIONS 
Mexican Japanese Indian 
PREDICATIONS 
Ridden burro (1) rickshaw (1) canoe (7,2) 
Worn poncho (3) kimono (1) moccasin (1,2) 
Eaten tamale (1) sushi (2) venison (1) 
NOTE: The numbers in parentheses ref le ct a word's 
appearance per million words on the Kucera and Francis (1967) 
list. The first number signifies the appearance of the given 
form of the word. The second number, where shown, signifies 
the appearance of variations of the word, such as plurals and 
possessives. 
Type of cue sentence. Each of the nine target words in 
Table 1 can be identified unambiguously, in the context of 
this learning experiment, as the intersection of a given 
"action" and a given "ethnic" predication. For example, 
moccasin is unambiguously identified as the intersection of 
worn ("action" predication) and Indian ("ethnic" predication) . 
Each cue sentence identified a target word as such an 
intersection of an "action" and an "ethnic" predication. For 
example, the cue sentence "Name the worn item that is Indian" 
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identified the target word moccasin. There were two types of 
cue sentences, designated Action-Ethnic and Ethnic-Action cue 
sentences. Action-Ethnic cue sentences contained an "action" 
predication in the subject position of the sentence, and an 
"ethnic" predication in the predicate position of the 
sentence. "Name the worn item that is Indian" is an example 
of an Action-Ethnic cue sentence. Ethnic-Action cue sentences 
contained an "ethnic" predication in the subject position of 
the sentence and an "action" predication in the predicate 
position of the sentence. "Name the Mexican item that is 
eaten" is an example of an Ethnic-Action cue sentence. 
Specifically, two non-overlapping sets of six cue 
sentences were created according to the following 
specifications: 
1. Three sentences were Action-Ethnic types of cue 
sentences, pairing an "action" subject with an "ethnic" 
predicate, in the form, "Name the [ridden/worn/eaten] 
item that is [Mexican/Japanese/ Indian]." Each "ethnic" 
predicate was paired with a different "action" subject. 
2. Three sentences were Ethnic-Action types of cue 
sentences, pairing an "ethnic" subject with an "action" 
predicate, in the form, "Name the [Mexican/Japanese/ 
Indian] item that is [ridden/worn/ eaten]." Each 
"action" predicate was paired with a different "ethnic" 
subject. 
3 . No two cue sentences within a set contained the 
same action/ethnic pairing; that is, no two cue sentences 
signified the same target word. 
4. The sets alternated Action-Ethnic and Ethnic-
Action types of cue sentences. Furthermore, one set 
began with an Action-Ethnic type of cue sentence, and the 
other set began with an Ethnic-Action type of cue 
sentence. 
43 
Each participant responded to one complete set of six cue 
sentences. Hence, each participant responded to three Action-
Ethnic cue sentences and three Ethnic-Action cue sentences. 
For example, Participant 3 was randomly assigned to respond to 
Question Set 2. In this set, cue sentences 1, 3, and 5 were 
Action-Ethnic cue sentences, and cue sentences 2, 4, and 6 
were Ethnic-Action cue sentences. Two different sets of cue 
sentences were used in order to strengthen claims for the 
generalizability and non-artifactual nature of the study's 
results. However, note that the cue sentence set itself was 
not an independent variable in this design; rather, type of 
cue sentence (Action-Ethnic or Ethnic-Action) , which cuts 
across the two cue sentence sets, was the independent variable 
under consideration. Furthermore, it is important to 
understand that, for participants in the Action and Ethnic 
conditions, a predication learned by the participant in the 
learning task was always present in a cue sentence. Only its 
position in the sentence as a subject or predicate varied. 
For example, in the Action-Ethnic cue sentence "Name the worn 
item that is Indian," a predication learned by Action 
condition participants, worn, was present in the subject 
position of the sentence; and a predication learned by Ethnic 
condition participants, Indian, was present in the predicate 
position of the sentence. Conversely, in the Ethnic-Action 
cue sentence "Name the Mexican item that is eaten," a 
predication learned by Action condition participants, eaten, 
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was present in the predicate position of the sentence; and a 
predication learned by Ethnic condition participants, Mexican, 
was present in the subject position of the sentence. Thus, 
excepting only for word order, participants had precisely the 
same amount and kind of information available to them in 
Action-Ethnic and Ethnic-Action cue sentences; that is, one 
and only one of the predications that they had learned in the 
learning task. (Appendix C contains the two complete sets of 
cue sentences used.) 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable used to assess ease of recall was 
response time; that is, the time taken to give a response to 
a cue sentence. It was scored specifically as the mean 
response time, to hundredths of seconds, averaged across the 
three cue sentences that the participant received of a given 
type (Action-Ethnic or Ethnic-Action). Therefore, two 
measures of the dependent variable were obtained for each 
participant, one for the three Action-Ethnic cue sentences, 
and the other for the three Ethnic-Action cue sentences. Only 
correct responses given within a three second time limit were 
included. (Pre-testing on a separate sample had demonstrated 
that 88% of responses given within three seconds were correct. 
Extending the time limit to four seconds increased the percent 
of correct responses by only one percent, to 89 percent. 
Therefore, the time limit for responding to the cue sentences 
was determined prior to this study to be three seconds.) 
45 
Participants needed to respond correctly within three seconds 
to at least one of the three cue sentences of a given type, 
for it to be possible to calculate the dependent variable. 
Only 17 participants, or 38%, reponded correctly to all three 
Ethnic-Action cue sentences within the three second time 
limit. Another 17 participants (including nine of the 17 
above), or 38%, responded correctly to all three Action-Ethnic 
cue sentences within the three second time limit. 
E.g. : 
Participant 3 was randomly assigned to respond to 
Question Set 2. He responded correctly to cue sentences 
2, 4, and 6 (Ethnic-Action) in 2.28s, 0.68s, and l.35s, 
respectively. He responded correctly to cue sentences 1 
and 3 (Action-Ethnic) in 1.23s and 1.15s, respectively. 
He did not respond correctly to cue sentence 5 (Action-
Ethnic) within the three second time limit. 
His dependent measure for Ethnic-Action cue 
sentences was calculated as the mean of 2.28, 0.68 and 
1.35, or l.44s. His dependent measure for Action-Ethnic 
cue sentences was calculated as the mean of 1. 2 3 and 
1.15, or 1.19s. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the procedure individually. They 
were randomly assigned to one of the three learning task 
conditions (Action, Ethnic, or Control condition) • 
Participants in all three conditions completed a learning task 
and a recall task. 
Learning task. Participants in the Action and Ethnic 
conditions were presented with a series of three triads of 
index cards. The first card of each triad displayed a 
category name that was either an action predication or an 
ethnic predication, depending on the participant's learning 
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task condition; the second card was blank; and the third card 
displayed the three target words belonging to that category 
(as shown in Table 1 above). For example, for an participant 
in the Action condition, the first card may have said "Worn" 
and the third card may then have said "poncho, kimono, 
moccasin." For an participant in the Ethnic condition, the 
first card may have said "Mexican" and the third card may then 
have said "burro, poncho, tamale." Similarly, the other 
triads displayed the remaining action or ethnic predications 
and target words. Again, it is emphasized that participants 
in both conditions learned the same complete set of nine 
target words, but under two different predications (either 
"action" or "ethnic" predications). 
The first time through the cards, these participants 
were instructed to simply read the cards and try to remember 
the target words that "go with" the predications. They viewed 
the predication (e.g., "Worn") for three (3) seconds, the 
blank card for five (5) seconds, and the target list (e.g., 
"poncho, kimono, moccasin") for five (5) seconds. After this 
initial trial, participants viewed the predication for one ( 1) 
second; it was then covered by a blank card while they 
reported which target words they recalled. Regardless of 
their performance, they then viewed the target list for five 
(5) seconds. Participants learned the target lists to the 
criterion of at least four successful anticipations when 
presented with the predication. Participants continued to 
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report all three target lists throughout the learning task, 
even if they learned one or two of the lists to criterion 
before the third. To control for order effects, the "random 
starting order with rotation" counterbalancing technique was 
employed (Shaughnessy & Zechmeister, 1985). That is, the 
order of target words within target lists followed the order 
shown in Table 1, but was rotated through the individual 
participant's learning trials; and also, the order of the 
predications themselves was rotated across participants. 
(Exact instructions to the Action and Ethnic condition 
participants are listed in Appendix A.) 
A Control condition was included to examine performance 
on the recall task of participants who did not learn any 
experimenter-given predication of the target words. It was 
impossible to have participants in this condition follow the 
same learning task procedure of the Action and Ethnic 
condition participants, where the latter reported groups of 
target words following the presentation of category names. 
Grouping or categorizing the words in any way would, according 
to LLT, suggest a predication of those words to the Control 
condition participants, which was precisely what this 
condition was designed to avoid. Therefore, an alternative 
learning task procedure was designed for Control condition 
participants. 
Participants in the Control condition viewed nine index 
cards with one target word printed on each card. They were 
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handed the nine cards in random order (shuffled by the 
experimenter), with the instruction to memorize the words, and 
to let the experimenter know when they were through. No 
predication was given, nor were the words grouped in any way. 
Thus, they learned the same set of nine target words as the 
participants in the Action and Ethnic conditions, but with no 
specific predication suggested. (Exact instructions to the 
Control condition participants are listed in Appendix B.) 
Two issues were involved in the noncomparability of the 
learning task of the Control condition with that of the Action 
and Ethnic conditions. First, much less was known about the 
type of learning strategy employed by participants in the 
Control condition. They might have spontaneously predicated 
the target words according to "action" categories or "ethnic" 
categories, or employed some idiosyncratic predication. In 
fact, it was this assumption of variability in the 
predications employed by Control condition participants that 
undergirded the prediction that these participants would not 
differ in response time to Action-Ethnic and Ethnic-Action cue 
sentences. If some participants employed an action 
predication in learning, others an ethnic predication, and 
still others different predications altogether, then any 
advantages of one type of cue sentence over the other should 
have canceled out. 
Second, the Control condition participants had a 
different and more subjective learning criterion than the 
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Action and Ethnic condition participants. Hence, it was not 
known how well these participants learned the target words 
relative to the participants in the other conditions, or even, 
perhaps, relative to one another. Systematic differences in 
learning (Control condition participants learning consistently 
better or consistently worse than participants in other 
conditions) would alter the mean response times of Control 
condition participants by a constant. Since the hypotheses 
required only comparing the mean response times to Ethnic-
Action vs. Action-Ethnic cue sentences within each condition 
and not across conditions, this would not affect the results 
of analyses. Nonsystematic differences in learning (some 
Control condition participants learning better and some 
learning worse than participants in other conditions) would 
introduce additional variability into the response times of 
Control condition subjects, reducing the power of analyses to 
detect an effect. This design issue is addressed in the 
Discussion below. 
Recall task. Following learning, participants were 
randomly assigned to respond to one of the two sets of six cue 
sentences, which were pre-recorded on a tape recorder in order 
to standardize the presentation. The cue sentences were read 
on tape by the experimenter, such that exactly three (3) 
seconds passed between the predication named in the subject 
position of the sentence and the predication named in the 
predicate position of the sentence. 
E.g. : 
"Name the worn item that is Indian." 
3 seconds 
"Name the Mexican item that is eaten." 
3 seconds 
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Participants were instructed to wait until the end of the 
question, then answer as quickly as possible (see Appendices 
A and B for exact instructions) . The cue sentences were 
played on a tape recorder, and these cue sentences and each 
participant's responses were recorded on a second tape 
recorder. The amount of time from the end of the cue sentence 
to the participant's response was later measured in 
milliseconds with a computer program available at the Parmly 
Hearing Institute, Loyola University of Chicago, and recorded 
to the hundredth of a second. This program graphed the 
amplitude of the tape-recorded sounds on a computer monitor, 
allowing precise measurement of the pause between the end of 
the cue sentence and the participant's response. The 
experimenter completed this measurement procedure blind to 
participants' learning task conditions, which were not 
discernable from the tape-recorded information. 
Participant loss. Initially, 53 participants signed up 
for this study. Three participants were lost prior to data 
collection; two of these were not native speakers of English, 
and the third was not satisfied with the initial explanation 
of the experiment. Another two participants completed the 
experiment but failed to give a sufficient number of correct 
responses in the recall task. All of these contingencies were 
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handled during the experiment by replacing the data of these 
participants with the data of the participants immediately 
following them. The data of another four participants were 
discarded after data collection but prior to data analysis, 
and were not replaced. Three of these participants (one each 
in the Action, Ethnic, and Control conditions) failed to give 
a sufficient number of correct responses in the recall task 
within the time limit of three seconds per cue. The fourth 
(in the Control condition) was lost due to an error made by 
the experimenter, of inadvertently setting "voice activation" 
on the recording tape recorder, such that the pauses between 
cue sentences and participant responses were not recorded. In 
all, nine participants were lost from the study, and the data 
of 44 participants (15 Action, 15 Ethnic, and 14 Control) were 
retained. 
Summary of design. A summary of the design of this 
study is presented in Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 



























response time to 
Action-Ethnic 
cue sentences 
No difference in 
response times 
to cue sentences 
Again, the dependent measure was the participant's mean 
response time, in seconds, to each type of cue sentence 
(Action-Ethnic and Ethnic-Action). These data were entered 
into a 3 (learning task condition) X 2 (type of cue sentence) 
factorial analysis of variance, with learning task condition 
a between-subjects variable and type of cue sentence a within-
subjects variable. The means and standard deviations for the 
response times, as a function of the learning task condition 
and type of cue sentence, are presented in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
STUDY 1 MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
OF RESPONSE TIMES TO CUE SENTENCES AS A FUNCTION 
OF LEARNING TASK CONDITION AND TYPE OF CUE SENTENCE 
TYPE OF CUE 
SENTENCE 
Action 











NOTE: Response times were scored as an participant's 
mean response time, in seconds, across all three cue sentences 
of a given type. Only correct responses made within three 
seconds were included. 
Hypothesis I can be tested with the interaction between 
learning task condition and type of cue sentence, and probed 
with the simple effects comparisons of mean response times to 
Ethnic-Action and Action-Ethnic cue sentences for the Action 
and Ethnic learning task conditions. Hypothesis I predicted 
that there would be a significant learning task condition X 
type of cue sentence interaction, with simple effects tests 
demonstrating that participants in the Action learning task 
condition responded to Ethnic-Action cue sentences faster, and 
participants in the Ethnic learning task condition responded 
to Action-Ethnic cue sentences faster. Contrary to Hypothesis 
I, there was no significant interaction between learning task 
condition and type of cue sentence, E(2, 41) = 2.04, n.s. 
Furthermore, the simple effects comparison of mean response 
times to Action-Ethnic cue sentences (M = 1.08, SD= 0.43) and 
Ethnic-Action cue sentences (M = 1.16, SD = 0.58) for the 
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Action learning task condition was not significant, ~(1, 41) 
= 0.24, n.s. Likewise, the simple effects comparison of mean 
response times to Action-Ethnic cue sentences (M = 1.12, SD= 
0.43) and Ethnic-Action cue sentences (M = 1.15, SD = 0.56) 
for the Ethnic learning task condition was not significant, 
~(1, 41) = 0.01, n.s. 
Hypothesis II can be tested with the interaction between 
learning task condition and type of cue sentence, and probed 
with the simple effects comparisons of Mean response times to 
Ethnic-Action and Action-Ethnic cue sentences in the Control 
learning task condition. Hypothesis II predicted that simple 
effects tests would demonstrate that participants in the 
Control learning task condition showed no significant 
difference in response times to type of cue sentence. As 
stated above, there was no significant interaction between 
learning task condition and type of cue sentence. Moreover, 
contrary to Hypothesis II, the simple effects comparison of 
mean response times to Action-Ethnic cue sentences (M = 0.87, 
SD = 0.31) and Ethnic-Action cue sentences (M = 1.36, SD = 
0.60) for the Control learning task condition was significant, 
,E(l, 41) = 7.39, 12. < .01. That is, Control condition 
participants responded significantly faster to Action-Ethnic 
cue sentences than to Ethnic-Action cue sentences. 
There was no significant main effect for learning task 
condition, ~(2, 41) = 0.01, n.s. There was an unpredicted 
trend toward significance for type of cue sentence, with 
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participants responding to Action-Ethnic cue sentences faster 
than to Ethnic-Action cue sentences, E ( 1, 41) = 3. 81, R < • 10, 
with the data arraying as follows: Action-Ethnic M = 1.03 (SD 
= 0.40), Ethnic-Action M = 1.22 (SD= 0.57). As stated above, 
planned comparisons demonstrated that this effect was due 
entirely to the performance of Control condition participants. 
Finally, it was observed that participants in the Ethnic 
learning task condition took fewer trials to criterion (M = 
2.60, SD = 1.45) to learn the target words than participants 
in the Action learning task condition (M = 3.60, SD= 2.59). 
However, a t-test performed on number of trials to criterion 
indicated that this difference was not significant, t(22.05) 
= 1.31, n.s., separate variance estimate. 
Conclusion 
The experimental hypotheses were not confirmed. 
Participants did not respond significantly faster to cue 
sentences containing the predication they learned in the 
predicate position of the sentence rather than in the subject 
position. On the other hand, the predictions of the 
mediational model were not confirmed, either. Participants 
did not respond significantly faster to cue sentences 
containing the predication they learned in the subject 
position of the sentence rather than in the predicate 
position. There was some evidence suggesting that 
participants might have found the Ethnic predications of the 
target words to be easier to learn than the Action 
56 
predications, with participants who learned the Ethnic 
predications taking an average of one fewer trial to reach 
learning criterion than participants who learned the Action 
predications (although the large variability in number of 
trials to criterion prevented this result from reaching 
significance) . Likewise, there was evidence of marginal 
significance that participants found sentences with an Ethnic 
predicate to be better recall cues than sentences with an 
Action predicate, answering them an average of 0.19s faster. 
As stated above, planned comparisons demonstrated that this 
effect was due entirely to the performance of Control 
condition participants, who answered cue sentences with an 
Ethnic predicate significantly faster than cue sentences with 
an Action predicate by an average of 0.49s. 
STUDY 2 
Logical Learning Theory posits that predication is one of 
the processes which defines human thinking, and for this 
reason predication is reflected in our language. Logical 
Learning Theory emphasizes that predication is not produced by 
language nor otherwise dependent on it (Rychlak, 1988, in 
press) . With respect to study 1, LLT would claim that it is 
not a linking or association of the predicate and target words 
that would produce a facilitation of one type of cue sentence 
over another. Rather, it is the process of extending the 
meaning of a particular predication to target items that 
produces such facilitation, regardless of the way in which the 
predication and target items are symbolized. To address this 
distinction, a replication study was designed to seek support 
for the hypotheses of Study 1, this time using geometric 
symbols (triangle, circle, square) instead of words to 
represent the predications learned by participants. This 
manipulation was devised to eliminate the associational 
advantages participants might be presumed (under mediational 
theorizing) to have received in Study 1 when they saw the same 
word as a predication during the learning task that was 
present in the cue sentence in the recall task. 





predications whether or not they verbally label or even 
recognize them as such. Then, when asked to recall a word 
according to those predications, these participants must "at 
the moment, " immediately frame the relevant predication --
realizing, if they did not already, that they have a ready-
made organization. Logical Learning Theory emphasizes that it 
is actually this formal-cause organization, not associational 
linkages between items, that facilitates recall. 
Statement of the Problem 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis I: It is predicted that participants who 
learn target words under a predication represented with 
a symbol will respond faster to cue sentences when that 
predication is represented with a word in the predicate 
position of the sentence, and respond slower to cue 
sentences containing identical information when that 
predication is represented with a word in the subject 
position of the sentence. 
Rationale 
As discussed immediately above, predication is understood 
in LLT as a process that is prior to language and not 
dependent on it. Therefore, this process should be able to be 
demonstrated whether verbal labels are employed or not. 
Excepting that symbols rather than words represent the 
predications that participants learn, Hypothesis I of Study 2 
is identical to Hypothesis I of Study 1, and follows from the 
same line of reasoning presented in Study 1 above. Recall 
will still be facilitated when the cue sentence represents the 
same organization as the participant's introspective 
organization, i.e., when the predicate of the cue sentence 
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contains the participant's initial predication, whether he or 
she labelled it as such or not. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 23 undergraduate students (9 male, 14 
female) enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Loyola 
University of Chicago. All participants were native English 
speakers. Participation in the experiment partially fulfilled 
a course requirement. 
Independent Variables 
Learning task condition. There were two experimental 
learning task conditions, designated the Action and Ethnic 
conditions, as in study 1. (There was no control learning 
task condition in this study.) Action and Ethnic learning 
condition participants again learned the set of nine target 
words from Study 1 under "action" or "ethnic" predications, 
respectively (refer to Table 1, p. 41). 
Type of cue sentence. Participants responded to one of 
the same two non-overlapping sets of six cue sentences created 
for Study 1. Hence, each participant responded to three 
Action-Ethnic cue sentences and three Ethnic-Action cue 
sentences (defined as in Study 1). Recall that the cue 
sentence set itself was not an independent variable in this 
design; rather, type of cue sentence (Action-Ethnic or Ethnic-
Action), which cuts across the two cue sentence sets, was the 
independent variable under consideration. 
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(Appendix C 
contains the two complete sets of cue sentences used.) 
Dependent Variable 
As in Study 1, the dependent variable used to assess ease 
of recall was response time; that is, the time taken to give 
a response to a cue sentence. It was scored specifically as 
the mean response time, measured to hundredths of seconds, 
averaged across the three cue sentences that the participant 
received of a given type (Action-Ethnic or Ethnic-Action). 
Therefore, two measures of the dependent variable were 
obtained for each participant, one for the three Action-Ethnic 
cue sentences, and the other for the three Ethnic-Action cue 
sentences. Correct responses given within a three second time 
limit were included. Only nine participants, or 38%, reponded 
correctly to all three Ethnic-Action cue sentences within the 
three second time limit. Another nine participants (including 
five of the nine above), or 38%, responded correctly to all 
three Action-Ethnic cue sentences within the three second time 
limit. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the procedure individually. They 
were randomly assigned to one of the two learning task 
conditions (Action or Ethnic condition). Participants in both 
conditions completed a learning task and a recall task. 
Learning task. This task was identical to the learning 
task of the first study, with the exception that the first 
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card of each triad, which represents the predicate, displayed 
a symbol (triangle, circle, or square) instead of a category 
name. For example, for an participant in the Action 
condition, the first card may have displayed a circle, and the 
third card may then have said "poncho, kimono, moccasin" (the 
implied predication here being "things that are worn"). For 
an participant in the Ethnic condition, the first card may 
also have displayed a circle, and the third card may then have 
said "burro, poncho, tamale" (the implied predication here 
being "things that are Mexican"). Similarly, the first card 
of the other triads displayed symbols of the remaining action 
or ethnic predications, and the third card displayed the 
corresponding target words. For each participant, the symbols 
corresponding to each predication remained the same throughout 
the learning task. For example, for Participant 1, who was in 
the Ethnic learning task condition, a square always symbolized 
the "Mexican" predication in Table 1, a circle always 
symbolized the "Indian" predication, and a triangle always 
symbolized the "Japanese" predication. The pairing of symbols 
with target words was randomly assigned to each participant 
from three different possible orderings within each learning 
task condition. For example, for Participant 4, the next 
participant in the Ethnic learning task condition, a square 
symbolized the "Japanese" predication, a circle symbolized the 
"Mexican" predication, and a triangle symbolized the "Indian" 
predication. As in study 1, it is emphasized that 
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participants in both the Ethnic and Action conditions learned 
the same complete set of nine target words, 
different predications (either "ethnic" 
predications). 
but under two 
or "action" 
The first time through the cards, participants were 
instructed to simply read the cards and try to remember the 
target words that "go with" the symbols. They viewed the 
symbol (e.g., a circle) for three (3) seconds, the blank card 
for five (5) seconds, and the target list (e.g., "poncho, 
kimono, moccasin") for five (5) seconds. After this initial 
trial, participants viewed the symbol for one (1) second; it 
was then covered by a blank card while they reported which 
target words they recalled. Regardless of their performance, 
they then viewed the target list for five (5) seconds. 
Participants learned the target lists to the criterion of at 
least four successful anticipations when presented with the 
symbol. As in study 1, participants continued to report all 
three target lists throughout the learning task, even if they 
learned one or two of the lists to criterion before the third. 
Furthermore, to control for order effects, the "random 
starting order with rotation" counterbalancing technique was 
again employed (Shaughnessy & Zechmeister, 1985). That is, 
the order of target words within target lists followed the 
order shown in Table 1, but was rotated through the individual 
participant's learning trials. (Exact instructions to 
participants are listed in Appendix A.) 
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Recall task. This task was identical to the recall task 
of the first study. Following learning, participants were 
randomly assigned to respond to one of the two pre-recorded 
sets of six cue sentences. Participants were instructed to 
wait until the end of the question, then answer as quickly as 
possible (see Appendix A for exact instructions). The cue 
sentences were played on a tape recorder, and these cue 
sentences and each participant's responses were recorded on a 
second tape recorder. The amount of time from the end of the 
cue sentence to the participant's response was later measured 
in milliseconds with a computer program available at the 
Parmly Hearing Institute, Loyola University of Chicago, and 
recorded to the hundredth of a second. This program graphed 
the amplitude of the tape-recorded sounds on a computer 
monitor, allowing precise measurement of the pause between the 
end of the cue sentence and the participant's response. The 
experimenter completed this measurement procedure blind to 
participants' learning task conditions, which were not 
discernable from the tape-recorded information. 
Participant loss. Initially, 27 participants signed up 
for this study. One participant was lost early in the 
learning task, stating she felt "bored" by the task and wished 
to leave. Another two participants completed the experiment 
but failed to give a sufficient number of correct responses in 
the recall task. These contingencies were handled during the 
experiment by replacing the data of these participants with 
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the data of the participants immediately following them. The 
data of another participant were discarded after data 
collection but prior to data analysis, and were not replaced. 
This participant (in the Action condition) failed to give a 
sufficient number of correct responses in the recall task 
within the time limit of three seconds per cue. In all, four 
participants were lost from the study, and the data of 23 
participants (11 Action and 12 Ethnic) were retained. 
Summary of design. A summary of the design of this 
study is presented in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
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Again, the dependent measure was the participant's mean 
response time, in seconds, to each type of cue sentence 
(Action-Ethnic and Ethnic-Action). These data were entered 
into a 2 (learning task condition) X 2 (type of cue sentence) 
factorial analysis of variance, with learning task condition 
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a between-subjects variable and type of cue sentence a within-
subjects variable. The means and standard deviations for the 
response times, as a function of the learning task condition 
and type of cue sentence, are presented in Table 5. 
TABLE 5 
STUDY 2 MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
OF RESPONSE TIMES TO CUE SENTENCES AS A FUNCTION 
OF LEARNING TASK CONDITION AND TYPE OF CUE SENTENCE 
LEARNING TASK CONDITION 










NOTE: Response times were scored as an participant's 
mean response time, in seconds, across all three cue sentences 
of a given type. Only correct responses made within three 
seconds were included. 
Hypothesis I can be tested with the interaction between 
learning task condition and type of cue sentence, and probed 
with the simple effects comparisons of Mean response times to 
Ethnic-Action and Action-Ethnic cue sentences for the Action 
and Ethnic learning task conditions. Hypothesis I predicted 
that there would be a significant learning task condition X 
type of cue sentence interaction, with simple effects tests 
demonstrating that participants in the Action learning task 
condition responded to Ethnic-Action cue sentences faster, and 
participants in the Ethnic learning task condition responded 
to Action-Ethnic cue sentences faster. Contrary to the 
hypothesis, there was no significant interaction between 
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learning task condition and type of cue sentence, E(l, 21) = 
0.99, n.s. Further, the simple effects comparison of mean 
response times to Action-Ethnic cue sentences (M = 0.87, SD= 
0.35) and Ethnic-Action cue sentences (M = 1.03, SD = 0.42) 
for the Ethnic learning task condition was not significant, 
E(l, 21) = 1.14, n.s. Finally, the simple effects comparison 
of mean response times to Action-Ethnic cue sentences (M = 
1.06, SD= 0.39) and Ethnic-Action cue sentences (M = 1.44, SD 
= 0.49) for the Action condition was significant, E(l, 21) = 
5. 75, 12 < • 05, with the means aligning in the opposite 
direction to that predicted. That is, Action condition 
participants responded significantly faster to Action-Ethnic 
cue sentences than to Ethnic-Action cue sentences. 
There was an unpredicted significant main effect for 
learning task condition, with participants in the Ethnic 
learning task condition responding to cue sentences faster 
than participants in the Action learning task condition, E(l, 
21) = 5.33, 12 < .05, with the data arraying as follows: Ethnic 
M = 0.95 (SD= 0.39), Action M = 1.25 (SD= 0.47). There was 
also an unpredicted significant main effect for type of cue 
sentence, with participants responding to Action-Ethnic cue 
sentences faster than to Ethnic-Action cue sentences, E(l, 21) 
= 6.11, 12 < .05, with the data arraying as follows: Action-
Ethnic M = 0.96 (SD= 0.38), Ethnic-Action M = 1.23 (SD= 
O. 49) . As stated above, planned comparisons demonstrated that 
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this effect was due entirely to the performance of Action 
condition participants. 
It was observed that participants in the Ethnic learning 
task condition took fewer trials to criterion CM= 3.50, SD= 
2. 24) to learn the target words than participants in the 
Action learning task condition CM = 4.91, SD = 2.70). 
However, a ~-test performed on number of trials to criterion 
indicated that this difference was not significant, ~C21) = 
1.37, n.s., pooled variance estimate. 
Conclusion 
The experimental hypothesis was not confirmed. 
Participants did not respond significantly faster to cue 
sentences containing the predication they learned in the 
predicate position of the sentence rather than in the subject 
position. In fact, the predictions of the mediational model 
were partially confirmed. Participants in the Action 
condition responded significantly faster to Action-Ethnic cue 
sentences, which contained the predication they learned in the 
subject position of the sentence, than to Ethnic-Action cue 
sentences, which contained the predication they learned in the 
predicate position of the sentence. 
Two lines of evidence suggested that participants found 
the Ethnic predications of the target words to be easier to 
learn than the Action predications. First, participants who 
learned the Ethnic predications took an average of 1.41 fewer 
trials to reach learning criterion than participants who 
learned the Action predications (al though the 
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large 
variability in number of trials to criterion prevented this 
result from reaching significance) . Second, participants who 
learned the Ethnic predications responded to recall cues 
significantly faster (by about 0.30s) than participants who 
learned the Action predications. Further, there was evidence 
that participants found sentences with an Ethnic predicate to 
be better recall cues than sentences with an Action predicate, 
answering them significantly faster by about o. 27s. As stated 
above, planned comparisons demonstrated that this effect was 
due entirely to the performance of Action condition 
participants, who answered cue sentences with an Ethnic 
predicate significantly faster than cue sentences with an 
Action predicate by an average of 0.38s. 
DISCUSSION 
It would seem that the present studies provide little in 
the way of confirmation for the original experimental 
predictions that were based on LLT's predicational model of 
learning. In no case was cued recall faster when the cue's 
grammatical predicate was the same as the predication with 
which the participant originally subsumed the target word. In 
one case (the Action learning task condition of Study 2), cued 
recall was faster when the cue's grammatical subject was the 
same as the predication with which the participant originally 
subsumed the target word. This result provides support for 
the predictions of mediational models of learning as outlined 
above, al though it was not robust in the sense of being 
replicated across other experimental conditions or studies. 
Although the design of the present studies was intended to 
provide a clear cut test of the competing predictions of 
predicational and mediational theorizing, the largely 
nonsignificant results are inconclusive. 
A look at the unpredicted significant results of the 
studies, as well as informal observations of participants, may 
provide some clues as to the failure of the design to perform 
as anticipated. First, it was observed that despite the use 
of the Kucera and Francis (1967) norms, many participants were 
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unfamiliar with the meanings of target words used in the 
studies, especially "rickshaw," "kimono," and "venison." (A 
number of participants also interpreted "burro" as a Mexican 
food instead of an animal.) Of course, these participants 
were unable to meaningfully categorize their unknown words; 
they struggled through the learning task by rote memorization 
of the appearance and pronunciation of these words. 
Therefore, their actual predications of the words were not the 
meanings that they were assumed to be using for the task. It 
is estimated that by far the largest proportion of failures of 
participants to respond quickly or correctly to cue sentences 
followed from this ignorance of word meanings. This 
circumstance, in turn, reduced the number of data points from 
which these participants' response time measures were 
constructed, decreasing confidence in the reliability and 
validity of this dependent measure. Furthermore, although 
some participants with unknown words no doubt successfully 
guessed the answers to cue sentences, in any case this would 
not represent the process of establishing and re-establishing 
known organizations that the studies were designed to engage, 
and response times for guessing would not necessarily be 
expected to conform to the predictions for the studies. 
Probably most harmful to the studies was the 
demoralization participants appeared to suffer regarding the 
experimental tasks when they did not know some of the words. 
Their comments suggested that they felt frustrated or 
71 
embarrassed, and they often appeared merely to endure the 
experiment rather than to continue to put effort into the 
tasks. The consistent effort of participants is crucial in a 
design that measures small differences in response time, and 
that effort was probably lacking in these studies. 
Unpredicted significant findings from the two studies 
provide further insight into the failure of the design to 
perform as expected. The design relied on the assumption that 
the Action and Ethnic predications would be equally meaningful 
-- essentially interchangeable -- ways for the participants to 
organize the target words. However, there is evidence that 
the Ethnic predications of the target words provided a more 
meaningful organization for participants than the Action 
predications. In both studies, participants who learned the 
target words according to the Ethnic predications took fewer 
trials to reach learning criterion than participants who 
learned the target words according to the Action predications. 
And in Study 2, participants who learned the targets according 
to the Ethnic predications were able to respond to recall cues 
in general significantly faster than participants who learned 
the targets according to the Action predications. Al though in 
principle, participants should be able to predicate the target 
words according to either the Action or the Ethnic meanings, 
Ethnic predications appear to have been a more central way of 
organizing meanings for most of these participants. Note that 
the greater meaningfulness of Ethnic predications for these 
72 
participants is simply an empirical result, the reasons for 
which are not illuminated by the present studies. A 
predicational view would suggest that these participants have 
actively elaborated meanings according to Ethnic predications 
in their personal meaning systems. A mediational view would 
suggest that these participants have had more exposure to 
Ethnic concepts. 
The greater meaningfulness of the Ethnic predications is 
corroborated by the informal observations that, first, 
participants who learned the targets according to the Action 
predications often spontaneously identified the Ethnic 
predications of the targets as well, whereas the participants 
who learned the targets according to the Ethnic predications 
did not correspondingly spontaneously identify the Action 
predications; and second, that participants in Study 2, who in 
a sense had to "catch on" to the predications symbolized by 
geometric shapes, frequently were unable to identify the 
Action predications. 
With these considerations, it is possible to make sense 
of the results of the studies using a predicational framework. 
In all conditions of both studies, cued recall was faster when 
an Ethnic predication was in the predicate position of the cue 
sentence. This is exactly the prediction LLT would make if it 
had been known that Ethnic categories were more meaningful 
predications to participants. That is, if it had been known 
that participants in all conditions would favor Ethnic 
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predications as a means of organizing the target words, then 
LLT would predict that cued recall would be facilitated for 
everyone when the Ethnic predication was in the predicate 
position of the cue sentence. (Likewise, mediational theories 
would then predict that cued recall would be facilitated for 
everyone when the Ethnic predication was in the subject 
position of the cue sentence.) 
It is notable that the significance of this result (i.e., 
participants' faster response times to cues with an Ethnic 
predication in the predicate position of the sentence) derived 
in Study 1 from the participants in the Control learning task 
condition, and in study 2 from the participants in the Action 
learning task condition. In both of these cases, participants 
had a more difficult and ambiguous task than participants in 
other conditions. Study 1 Control learning task participants 
had to find a way to organize the target words on their own, 
without relying on experimenter-given predications; and Study 
2 Action learning task participants had to discern an 
experimenter-given predication, in the absence of verbal 
labels, that appears not to have been a very meaningful 
conceptualization for them. It was precisely these 
participants who benefitted the most from the introduction of 
a more meaningful predicational pattern, as represented by the 
cues with an Ethnic predication in the predicate position of 
the sentence. Whether participants organized the target words 
according to the more meaningful Ethnic predications 
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consciously during their initial learning, or framed the more 
meaningful Ethnic predications for the first time when 
questioned with the cue sentences, LLT would predict the same 
outcome: participants would respond faster to cue sentences 
that reflected their more meaningful organization of the 
words, which in this case was the cue sentences with an Ethnic 
predication in the predicate position. (Note that the fact of 
a significant finding for control learning task participants 
obviates the problem of a possible lack of power in their 
analysis that was discussed in the Method of Study 1.) 
There is another possible explanation for the superiority 
of recall cues with an Ethnic predication in the predicate 
position. A close consideration of the words employed as 
predications reveals that the Action predications ("ridden," 
"worn," "eaten") are past participles -- verb forms that play 
the role of adjectives. On the other hand, the Ethnic 
predications ("Mexican," "Japanese," and "Indian") are the 
adjectival forms of nouns. Hence, the Ethnic predications 
come closer to a typical object of a sentence, as a "thing-
related" item, a categorization that is closer to a noun than 
a verb. English is an svo language (Ultan, 1969); it follows 
a subject-verb-object word ordering. Cue sentences containing 
a verb-like Action predication followed by an object-like 
Ethnic predication are more similar to the linguistic ordering 
of English than are cue sentences containing an object-like 
Ethnic predication followed by a verb-like Action predication. 
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(In this interpretation, the two predications in the cue 
sentences are understood as forming a complete predicate of 
verb and object, which take as their subject the target words, 
rather than as forming a complete sentence of subject and 
predicate.) It is possible that it is this aspect of English 
grammar that underlies the facilitation of recall by cue 
sentences with the Ethnic predication in the latter part of 
the sentence. And again, such a formal-cause patterning would 
appear to have had the greatest utility for those participants 
who were initially without a clear organization of the target 
words. 
Of course, both of the above interpretations are post hoc 
explanations of unpredicted results. While the results of the 
present studies may be considered suggestive, further research 
will be necessary in order to place confidence in either of 
these interpretations. If a difference in the introspective 
meaningfulness of the predications to the participants is the 
reason for this pattern of results, then controlling more 
explicitly for the meaningfulness of the predications, perhaps 
through pre-testing, might allow a confirmation of the initial 
predictions of the design. Further, for any attempt at 
replication of this design, it is recommended that familiarity 
with the target words be normed on a local sample of 
participants. If a difference in the grammatical role of the 
predications in the English language is the reason for this 
pattern of results, then using only noun-derived adjectives as 
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predications might allow a confirmation of the initial 
predictions of the design. On the other hand, the phenomenon 
of predicational differences produced by different parts of 
speech also deserves study in its own right, as it supports 
LLT' s crucial contention that all associations are not created 
equal, and that formal cause has priority in cognition. 
I began this thesis with considerations of the empirical 
demonstration of human agency. Logical Learning Theory 
proposes that human agency can be supported with evidence for 
a predicational process of cognition. The present studies 
were unable to provide clear results in support of cognition 
as either predicational or mediational. However, the results 
may be seen as suggestive of yet unexplored aspects of the 
predicational process as it is reflected in grammatical 
structure. The explorations begun in the present studies 
point the way to continued inquiry into the predicational view 
of cognition and the agential view of the person. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Instructions to Action and Ethnic 
Learning Task Condition Participants in study 1 {Study 2) 
This is an experiment on learning. I'm going to have 
you learn three groups of words of three words each. The 
words are printed on these cards. I will show you a category 
name (symbol) on one card, then a blank card, then a group of 
words on the next card. 
The first time we go through the cards, just read them 
to yourself and try to remember the groups of words. After 
that, when I show you a category name (symbol) , try to tell me 
the group of words that goes with it. We will go through the 
cards until you remember all the words four times in a row, 
because I need you to learn the words really well. Then I 
will have you try to recall certain words that you have 
learned. 
Any questions? 
Now we will go through the cards the first time. Read 
the category names and the groups of words to yourself, and 
try to remember them. (Look at the symbols and read the 
groups of words to yourself, and try to remember them.) Okay? 
Now when I give you the category name (symbol), try to 
tell me the group of words that goes with it. After you tell 
me what you remember, I will show you the group of words 
again. We will keep doing this until you remember all of the 
words four times in a row. Ready? 
Now I'm going to have you answer the questions about the 
words, which I have recorded on this tape recorder. I am 
going to tape your answers on the other tape recorder. Later 
I'm going to time how fast you answered. 
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So answer as quickly as you can. But listen carefully, 
because you will give your answer based only on the tape; I 
can't repeat anything for you. Also, think first, because I 
have to count the first answer you give, and you can't correct 
it. Wait until the end of the question, then answer as 
quickly as you can. Okay? 
APPENDIX B 
Instructions to Control 
Learning Task Condition Participants in Study 1 
This is an experiment on learning. I'm going to have 
you learn nine words. The words are printed on these cards. 
I will let you look at the cards until you feel you have 
memorized the words. I need you to learn the words really 
well. Then I will have you try to recall certain words that 
you have learned. 
Any questions? 
Now look at the cards and try to memorize the words. 
You can arrange the cards any way you want. Tell me when you 
are finished. Okay? 
Now I'm going to have you answer the questions about the 
words, which I have recorded on this tape recorder. I am 
going to tape your answers on the other tape recorder. Later 
I'm going to time how fast you answered. 
So answer as quickly as you can. But listen carefully, 
because you will give your answer based only on the tape; I 
can't repeat anything for you. Also, think first, because I 
have to count the first answer you give, and you can't correct 
it. Wait until the end of the question, then answer as 
quickly as you can. Okay? 
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APPENDIX C 
cue Sentence Sets 
cue Sentence Response Type of Cue 
Sentence 
SET 1 
1.Name the Mexican item that is eaten. Tamale Ethnic-Action 
2.Name the worn item that is Indian. Moccasin Action-Ethnic 
3. Name the Japanese i tern that is worn. Kimono Ethnic-Action 
4.Name the ridden item that is Mexican. Burro Action-Ethnic 
5.Name the Indian item that is ridden. Canoe Ethnic-Action 
6.Name the eaten item that is Japanese. Sushi Action-Ethnic 
SET 2 
1.Name the ridden item that is Indian. Canoe Action-Ethnic 
2. Name the Mexican i tern that is worn. Poncho Ethnic-Action 
3 .Name the eaten item that is Mexican. Tamale Action-Ethnic 
4 .Name the Japanese item that is ridden.Rickshaw Ethnic-Action 
5. Name the worn i tern that is Japanese. Kimono Action-Ethnic 




In this experiment, we were studying the influence of how 
you learn something, and how you are asked about it, on how 
easily (fast) you can recall it. 
We believe that people learn by subsuming what they are 
learning - their "target" - with a broader meaning - a 
"predicate." This differs from traditional learning theories, 
because we believe that learning does not mean merely 
associating two things. Instead, learning means bringing to 
bear a pattern in order to grasp what is being learned. (In 
language, this pattern is represented with the grammatical 
subject acting as the "target," and the grammatical predicate 
acting as the "predicate.") 
In the present study, we showed you sequences of a 
predicate and three target words on index cards. There are 
many ways to predicate or group those words, but you learned 
just one. We then gave you instructions on the tape recorder 
to recall some of the target words. The predicate you learned 
was always included somewhere in the instruction, and 
sometimes it was also the grammatical predicate of the 
instruction, but other times it was not. 
We are hypothesizing that the instructions in which the 
predicate you learned was also the grammatical predicate of 
the instruction, made it easier to recall the target. We 
think people will answer those faster. 
This research is based on the theory of Dr. Joseph F. 
Rychlak, of our Department of Psychology. The book in which 
this kind of theory is presented is listed below. But if you 
want to discuss any of this with him, he would be happy to 
arrange an appointment with you. 
Rychlak, J. F. (1988). The psvchology of rigorous humanism 
(2nd ed.). New York: New York University Press. 
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APPENDIX E 
Data of study 1 
Key 
Part No = Participant number 
LTC = Learning task condition 
Ques Set = Question set 
Ques(n) = Response time (in seconds) to question n 
Part First Trials to Ques 
_HQ__ Sex LTC Card Criterion Set Quesl Ques2 Ques3 Ques4 Ques5 Ques6 
1 F Action Eaten 3 1 1. 34 1. 08 0.52 - - 0.60 
2 F Control - - 2 - 0.92 - - 1. 30 
00 3 M Ethnic Mexican 2 2 1.23 2.28 1.15 0.68 - 1.35 
"' 4 M Action Ridden 4 2 0.71 1.08 - 0.80 0.41 1.33 5 F Ethnic Japanese 4 1 0.80 1.01 1.04 1.77 0.36 0.73 
6 F Control - - 1 1. 65 - 0.84 - - 0.65 
7 F Control - - 2 - 0.80 - - 0.68 
8 M Ethnic Indian 2 1 0.88 2.45 0.87 2.70 0.93 0.75 
9 F Action Worn 2 1 1. 60 2.67 - - 0.95 0.85 
10 F Control - - 1 1. 04 0.68 1. 39 0.75 - 0.87 
11 F Action Eaten 7 2 2.15 1.20 0.56 
12 F Ethnic Mexican 2 2 - 0.44 1.15 2.21 0.38 
13 F Action Ridden 1 1 0.80 - 1.90 0.58 - 0.55 
14 M Ethnic Japanese 2 2 - - 1.10 0.31 0.71 
15 M Control - - 1 1. 37 1.05 0.71 - 1.51 0.71 
16 F Ethnic Indian 2 1 1.20 - 0.70 2.40 0.69 0.58 
17 F Control - - 2 1. 35 1.41 1.11 - 0.64 
18 F Action Worn 3 2 - 1.46 0.94 - 2.15 1.65 
19 F Control - - 1 1.45 - 0.65 0.38 - 0.82 
20 F Action Eaten 4 2 2.58 0.61 2.14 - 0.47 
21 M Ethnic Mexican 2 1 2.32 0.91 1. 65 - 0.73 0.69 
Part First Trials to 
__HQ_ Sex LTC Card Criterion 
22 M Action Ridden 7 
23 F Ethnic Japanese 2 
24 F Action Worn 1 
25 M Control - -
26 M Ethnic Indian 1 
27 F Ethnic Mexican 4 
28 M Control - -
29 F Control - -
30 F Action Ridden 3 
31 M Ethnic Indian 6 
32 F Control - -
33 M Action Worn 1 
34 M Ethnic Mexican 2 
35 F Control - -
36 F Action Eaten 2 
37 F Ethnic Japanese 2 
38 M Control - -
39 M Action Ridden 10 
40 F Control - -
41 F Action Worn 4 
42 F Ethnic Indian 5 
43 F Action Eaten 2 
44 M Control - -
45 F Ethnic Mexican 1 
Ques 
Set Quesl Ques2 Ques3 
1 - 2.90 1. 79 
2 1.99 1.26 1. 30 
2 2.95 0.38 0.63 
2 0.84 1. 52 0.52 
1 1. 01 0.40 1. 05 
2 - - 2.24 
1 - - 2.80 
1 1. 32 1. 39 0.38 
2 - 0.98 0.72 
1 1. 39 - 0.93 
2 - - -
1 1.16 0.37 0.24 
1 1. 60 1. 08 0.84 
1 2.15 2.77 1. 78 
1 0.49 2.79 0.68 
2 - 0.82 1.92 
2 - 1. 09 1. 37 
2 - - 0.86 
2 - 0.94 1.56 
1 1.80 0.54 0.47 
2 - - 0.49 
2 0.79 0.14 0.90 
1 0.61 0.73 0.34 









































































Data of Study 2 
Key 
Part No = Participant number 
LTC = Learning task condition 
Ques Set = Question set 
Ques(n) = Response time ( in seconds) to question n 
Part First Trials to Ques 
_jfQ_ Sex LTC Card Criterion Set Q__uesl Ques2 Ques3 Ques4 Ques5 Ques6 
1 M Ethnic Mexican 2 1 0.99 1.55 0.43 1. 09 0.50 0.23 
2 F Action Eaten 3 1 1.37 1.06 0.48 - 0.44 0.62 
3 F Action Ridden 5 1 1.42 - 1. 22 0.99 0.84 0.54 
OJ 
4 F Ethnic Indian OJ 2 1 1. 00 - 0.47 0.69 1.46 0.82 
5 M Action Worn 5 1 2.92 2.60 0.75 2.75 1.18 0.52 
6 F Ethnic Japanese 9 1 1.29 - 1.29 - - 0.63 
7 M Action Worn 3 2 2.57 1.48 0.90 - 0.52 
8 F Action Eaten 5 2 - - 1.22 2.10 0.58 
9 F Action Ridden 3 2 - 0.79 - - 0.83 
10 F Ethnic Indian 2 2 2.87 0.29 0.52 2.10 1.10 0.47 
11 F Ethnic Japanese 4 2 - 0.67 0.77 - 0.38 0.07 
12 M Ethnic Mexican 6 2 0.51 1.14 0.54 0.53 0.10 1.04 
13 F Ethnic Japanese 2 2 - 1.58 - - 1.24 
14 F Ethnic Mexican 2 2 1.59 1.07 1.12 0.63 0.82 
15 F Action Eaten 8 2 - 1.88 1.11 - 0.54 
16 M Ethnic Indian 4 2 - 1.11 0.52 - 0.69 
17 M Action Worn 8 2 2.03 1.88 1.41 - 0.05 
18 F Ethnic Japanese 5 1 2.27 - 0.99 - - 0.82 
19 M Ethnic Mexican 2 1 - 0.69 0.50 0.32 - 0.52 
20 F Action Ridden 2 1 - 2.42 0.96 - - 0.61 
21 M Ethnic Indian 2 1 2.85 1. 07 0.69 1.99 1. 02 0.63 
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